This paper asks whether increases in government spending stimulate private activity. The first part of the paper studies private spending. Using a variety of identification methods and samples, I find that in most cases private spending falls significantly in response to an increase in government spending. These results imply that the average GDP multiplier lies below unity. In order to determine whether concurrent increases in tax rates dampen the spending multiplier, I use two different methods to adjust for tax effects. Neither method suggests significant effects of current tax rate changes on the spending multiplier. In the second part of the paper, I explore the effects of government spending on labor markets. I find that increases in government spending lower unemployment. Most specifications and samples imply, however, that virtually all of the effect is through an increase in government employment, not private employment. I thus conclude that on balance government spending does not appear to stimulate private activity.
Introduction
The potential stimulus effects of fiscal policy have once again become an active area of academic research. Before The Great Recession, the few researchers who estimated the effects of government spending did so in order to understand which macroeconomic models were the best approximation to the economy. Rather than analyzing differences in estimated multipliers, most of the literature debated whether the movements of key variables, such as real wages and consumption, were more consistent with Keynesian or Neoclassical views of fiscal policy (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Burnside et al. (2004) , and Perotti (2008)). Starting with the stimulus debate, however, the focus shifted to empirical estimates of multipliers. In Ramey (2011b) , I surveyed the growing recent literature that estimates government spending multipliers in aggregate national data as well as in state panel data. Reviewing that literature, I found that the range of estimates of the GDP multiplier is often as wide within studies as it is across studies. I concluded that the multiplier for a deficit-financed temporary increase in government spending probably lies somewhere between 0.8 and 1.5, but could be as low as 0.5 or as high as 2.
Two of the key questions for deciding whether policy-makers should use government spending for short-run stabilization policy are: (1) Can an increase in government spending stimulate the economy in a way that raises private spending? and (2)
Can an increase in government spending raise employment and lower unemployment?
With respect to the first question, if an increase in government spending raises GDP without raising private sector spending, then private welfare does not necessarily rise.
With respect to the second question, most economists and policy makers would agree that job creation is at least as important a goal as stimulating output. In theory, one can use Okun's Law to translate GDP multipliers to unemployment multipliers. However, because of variations in the parameters of this "law" over time, the advent of jobless recoveries, and the frictions involved in creating and filling jobs, the translation of output multipliers to employment or unemployment multipliers is not straightforward. Thus, it makes sense to devote as much attention to the employment effects of government spending as to the output effects.
Thus, this paper empirically studies the effect of government spending on private spending, unemployment, and employment. I define private spending to be GDP less government spending. I show that whether one uses structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) or expectational vector autoregressions (EVARS), whether the sample includes WWII and Korea or excludes them, an increase in government spending never leads to a significant rise in private spending. In fact, in most cases it leads to a significant fall.
These results imply that the government spending multiplier is more likely below one rather than above one.
These estimates are based on samples in which part of the increase in government spending is financed by an increase in tax rates, so the multipliers are not necessarily the ones applicable to current debates on deficit-financed stimulus packages. I thus explore two different ways to adjust for the increase in taxes in order to determine a deficit-financed government spending multiplier. One method uses the VARs to create counterfactuals and the other uses more structural instrumental variables estimates.
Surprisingly, both methods suggest that the behavior of marginal tax rates does not have a significant effect on the size of the spending multiplier.
In the final part of the paper I investigate the effects of government spending on unemployment and employment. I begin by conducting a case study of labor markets during the WWII period. I then use the VAR methods on various samples and find that an increase in government spending lowers unemployment. However, I find the surprising result that in the great majority of time periods and specifications, all of the increase in employment after a positive shock to government spending is due to an increase in government employment, not private employment. There is only one exception. These results suggest that the employment effects of government spending work through the direct hiring of workers, not stimulating the private sector to hire more workers.
Background

Output Multipliers
There has been a dramatic increase in research on the output multiplier in the last few years. The aggregate studies that estimate the multiplier fit in two general categories.
The first are the studies that use long spans of annual data and regress the growth rate of GDP on current and one lag of defense spending, or government spending instrumented by defense spending(e.g. Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011) ). These studies tend to find multipliers that are less than one. The second type are the vector autoregressions (VARs) estimated on quarterly data, such as those used by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Fisher and Peters (2010) , Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) , and Ramey (2011a) . Some of these papers calculate the multipliers based on comparing the peak of the government spending response to the peak of the GDP response. Others compare the area under the two impulse response functions. As I discuss in my forum piece for the Journal of Economic Literature (Ramey (2011b) ), the range of multiplier estimates are often as wide within studies as across studies. An interesting, but unnoticed, pattern arises from this literature. In particular, the Blanchard-Perotti style SVARs yield smaller multipliers than the expectational VARs (EVARS), such as the ones used in my work.
This result is intriguing because the SVARs tend to find rises in consumption whereas the EVARs tend to find falls in consumption in response to an increase in government spending. Overall, most output multiplier estimates from the aggregate literature tend to lie between 0.5 and 1.5.
There are also numerous papers that use cross-sections or panels of states to estimate the effects of an increase in government spending in a state on that state's income.
These papers typically find multipliers of about 1.5. However, translating these statelevel multipliers to aggregate multipliers is tricky, as discussed in Ramey (2011b) .
While the explicit instrumental variables frameworks with few dynamics provide statistical confidence bands around the implied multipliers, the VAR-based literature does not. Typically, the VAR literature provides separate impulse responses of government spending, GDP and the spending subcomponents, and then calculates an implied multiplier by either comparing the peak response of GDP to the peak response of government spending, or comparing the integral under the two impulse response functions. As I will show below, a simple permutation of the VAR makes it easy to provide confidence intervals of the multiplier relative to unity.
Labor Market Effects of Government Spending
A few of the older papers and a growing number of recent papers have studied government spending effects on labor markets. Most of the studies that exploit cross-state or locality variation focus on employment as much as income. For example, Davis, Steven J. and Mahidhara (1997) and Hooker and Knetter (1997) were among the first to study the effects of defense spending shocks on employment in a panel of states.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) study similar effects in updated data. Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) analyze the effects of various New Deal programs during the 1930s on states and localities. Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel and Woolston (2010) and Wilson (2010) estimated the effects of the recent American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) on employment using cross-state variation. As summarized by Ramey (2011b) , on average these and related studies produce estimates that imply that each $35,000
of government spending produces one extra job. However, some of these studies, such as by Wilson (2010) , find that the jobs disappear quickly.
At the aggregate level, the recent paper by Monacelli, Tommaso and Trigari (2010) analyzes the effects of government spending shocks on a number of labor market variables. In particular, they use a standard structural VAR to investigate the effects of government spending shocks on unemployment, vacancies, job finding rates and separation rates in the post-1954 period. Their point estimates suggest that positive shocks to government spending lower the unemployment rate and the separation rate, and increase vacancies and the job finding rate. However, their estimates are imprecise, so most of their points estimates are not statistically different from zero at standard significance levels. On the other hand, Bruckner and Pappa (2010) study the effects of fiscal expansions on unemployment in a sample of OECD countries using quarterly data. Whether they use a standard SVAR, sign restrictions, or the Ramey-Shapiro military dates, they find that a fiscal expansion often increases the unemployment rate. In most cases, these increases are statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level.
In sum, the studies using state or local panel data find more robust positive effects of government spending on employment than the aggregate studies. As discussed above, translating state-level multipliers to the aggregate is not straightforward.
The Distinction between Government Purchases and Government Value Added
To understand why there is not a one-to-one correspondence between output multipliers and private employment multipliers, it is useful to consider the distinction between government spending on private goods versus government output. In the National Income and Product Accounts, government purchases "G" includes both government purchases of goods from the private sector, such as aircraft carriers, and government value added, which is comprised of compensation of government employees, such as payments to military and civilian personnel, and consumption of government capital. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) made this distinction in their empirical work by examining shocks to total defense spending after conditioning on lags of the number of military personnel. Wynne (1992) was the first to point out the theoretical distinction between government spending on purchases of goods versus compensation of government employees. He used comparative statistics in a neoclassical model to demonstrate the different effects. Finn (1998) explored the issue in a fully dynamic neoclassical model. She showed that increases in G resulting from an increase in government employment and increases in G resulting from an increase in purchases of goods from the private sector have opposite effects on private sector output, employment, and invest- shows the usual way of dividing goods and services according to which entity purchased the goods. "G" is the usual National Income and Product Account category of "Government Purchases of Goods and Services." The rest of the output is purchased by the private sector, either as consumption, investment or net exports. The middle panel divides the economy according to who produces the goods and services. Production by the government occurs when it directly hires workers and buys capital stock. The value added is counted as production by this sector. Examples include education services, police services, military personnel services, and other general government activities. 1 All other production is done by the private sector. The third panel superimposes these two ways of dividing the economy. As the panel illustrates, government purchases (G) consists of the value added of government (Y Gov ), which the government itself produces and essentially "sells" to itself, and government purchases of goods and services from the private sector (G P r i v ). During the typical military buildup, the government both hires more military personnel, resulting in more government production, and buys tanks from the private sector. Thus, both components of G rise.
To see why different types of government spending can have different effects, consider the following key equations from an augmented neoclassical model. Consider first the production function for private value added:
1. The output of government enterprises, such as the Post Office, are included in the private business sector.
(1)
where Y Priv is private value added, N P r iv is private employment, and K P r iv is the private capital stock. The number of workers available for private employment is determined by the labor resource constraint:
whereT is the time endowment, N Gov is government employment, and L is leisure.
Thus, one way that the government draws resources from the private sector is through the labor resource constraint. Another way that the government draws resources from the private sector is through its purchases of private goods. In this case, the affected resource constraint is the one for private output, given by:
where G P r i v is government purchases from the private sector. Total G from the national income and product accounts (NIPA) is:
where Y Gov is government value added, created by combining government employment with government capital as follows:
Under reasonable assumptions about labor markets and production functions, the relative price of private and government output is one, so total GDP is given by:
In the context of this type of model, an increase in government spending raises total employment. However, the extent to which government spending raises private employment depends on whether the increase in G is due more to an increase in purchases of private sector output or more to an increase in government output and employment.
We would expect private sector employment to rise in the first case but to fall in the second case. Thus, a rise in overall employment does not necessarily imply a rise in private sector employment, so it is important to distinguish private versus government employment in the data.
The Effects on Private Spending
In most studies using aggregate data and VARs, government spending multipliers are usually calculated by comparing the peak of the output response to the peak of the government spending response or by comparing the integral under the impulse response functions up to a certain horizon. Usually, no standard errors are provided, but given the wide standard error bands on the output and government spending components, the standard error bands on the multipliers are assumed to be large. Studies of the subcomponents of private spending, such as nondurable consumption or nonresidential fixed investment, often give mixed results with wide error bands.
As I will now show, a simple permutation of the variables in a standard vector autoregression (VAR) can lead to more precise estimates for the relevant policy question:
on average does an increase in government spending raise private spending? To answer this question, I will use a standard set of VAR variables employed by many in the literature with one modification: I will use private spending (Y -G) rather than total GDP. Since previous VAR studies have shown that the peak of government spending and the peak of total GDP are roughly coincident in the impulse response functions, I
do not distort the results by considering only the contemporaneous multiplier.
Econometric Framework
To study the effects of government spending shocks on private spending, I will estimate the following VAR system:
where X t is a vector of variables that includes the log of real per capita government spending on goods and services (G), the log of real per capita private spending (Y-G), In more recent work in Ramey (2011a) , I extended this idea and used sources such as Business Week to construct a series of changes in the expected present discounted value of government spending caused by military events. I divided this series by the previous quarter's GDP to create a "news" series. This series augments the list of variables in the "X" matrix in the VAR above and the shock is identified as the shock to this series, using a standard Choleski decomposition with the news series ordered first. Perotti (2011) has termed VARs that incorporate news "Expectational VARs" or "EVARs." 
VAR Results
Figure 3 Figure 5 shows the responses based the Fisher-Peters type SVAR, where government spending shocks are identified as shocks to the excess stock returns for defense contractors. In contrast to the three previous specifications in which government spending peaks around quarter 6 and returns to normal between 12 and 14 quarters, this shock leads to a more sustained increase in government spending. Government spending barely falls from its peak even after 20 quarters. Private spending oscillates around zero, but is only becomes statistically different from zero when it becomes negative at longer horizons.
Thus, the SVAR specifications give essentially the same answer to the question posed as the EVAR specifications: a rise in government spending does not appear to stimulate private spending. In fact, in many samples and specifications, it reduces private spending.
An interesting point to note is that the VAR results imply a time-varying multiplier that shrinks as government spending hits its peak. This result is consistent with Gordon and Krenn's (2010) finding of a higher multiplier in samples ending in mid-1941 when the increase in government spending was more modest than in samples ending later.
The Effects of Taxes and Implications for Multipliers
These results imply that for the types of changes in government spending identified by the various schemes, the total GDP multiplier lies below unity. In every case, there is evidence that government spending crowds out private spending. On average, though, these increases in government spending were financed partly by a rise in distortionary taxes. Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of the Barro and Redlick (2011) average marginal tax rate for the various samples for both the Ramey News EVAR and Blanchard-Perotti SVAR specifications. In five of the six cases, the tax rate rises significantly. It rises much more in the Ramey News EVAR.
Romer and Romer (2010) construct a measure of exogenous tax shocks using a narrative approach that summarizes tax legislation. They show that the reduced-form effect of a tax shock equal to one percent GDP leads to a multi-year decline in GDP equal to 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP by the end of the third year. These estimates sug-gest that the multiplier could potentially be greater for a deficit-financed increase in government spending than for one in which taxes rise.
To gauge how much the rise in taxes dampen the spending multiplier, I conduct two different kinds of experiments. The first one uses the estimated VARs to conduct counterfactual analysis and the second uses instrumental variables estimation of a more structural model. In the first method using the estimated VARs, I compare the actual estimated impulse response to one in which I assume counterfactually that the tax rate did not change. That is, I set all of the coefficients in the tax rate equation to 0. I then compute the alternative impulse response based on a dynamic simulation using the actual estimated coefficients from the other equations and the 0 coefficients from the tax rate equation. Because VARs are essentially reduced form relationships, it is difficult to make structural interpretations. Thus, my second method uses instrumental variables to estimate the separate effects of government spending and taxes on private output. I specify the following baseline quarterly model, which is similar in structure to the one used by Barro and Redlick (2011) on their long sample of annual data: My survey of the estimates in the literature in Ramey (2011b) concluded that the multiplier for a deficit-financed short-run increase in government spending was probably between 0.8 and 1.5, but that reasonable people could argue for multipliers as low as 0.5 or as high as 2. The main reason that I had placed the lower end of the probable range at 0.8 was my belief, based on the Romer and Romer (2010) reduced-form results, that the tax effects on GDP were large. The results of this section suggest otherwise. The counterfactuals constructed from the VAR estimates imply that accounting for current tax rates has no impact on the estimated government spending multiplier.
The instrumental variables estimates imply that controlling for changes in tax rates raises the multiplier slightly, by about 0.15 to 0.2. The instrumental variables estimates imply a government spending multiplier on total GDP of about 0.5. This is very close to the estimate obtained using annual data by Barro and Redlick (2011) .
The Effects of Government Spending on Unemployment and Employment
As we saw in the last section, no matter which identification scheme or which sample period was used, an increase in government spending did not lead to an increase in private sector spending. In most cases, it led to a significant decrease. Even in the face of this result, though, policymakers might still want to use stimulus packages to reduce unemployment. There is substantial microeconomic evidence that long spells of unemployment lead to persistent losses of human capital. Thus, even if government spending cannot stimulate private spending, it might still have positive effects by raising employment.
Thus, this section studies several aspects of the labor market. It begins with a case study of the labor market during WWII because the dramatic changes of this era highlight some useful points. In the second subsection, I use the VARs from above to study the effects of government spending shocks on unemployment. In the third subsection, I study their effects on private versus government employment. Figure 9 shows the behavior of various employment components around this time and Table 2 presents the net changes. The first feature to note from the figure is that, despite the fact that government spending rose by only 2.6 percent of initial GDP, total employment rose by 8 percent from 1938 to September 1940, and that most of the increase in total employment was due to an increase in private employment.
A Case Study of the Labor Market During WWII
As the table shows, from September 1940 to the peak in March 1945, total employment rose by 15.6 million, a 27 percent increase in log differences. Most of the rise was due to the rise in military employment, though. Government civilian employment (including New Deal emergency workers) declined slightly during this period. As the figure shows, private employment was rising robustly from 1938 through most of 1941, but then leveled off.
Over this same time period, the population ages 14 and above rose by 5.4 million, but the labor force rose by 11.1 million. Figure 10 shows the dramatic increase in the labor force participation rate. Decennial data from before 1930 suggests a typical labor force participation rate around 56 percent. It was a little lower during the 1930s because of the Great Depression. As the graph shows, during WWII, the participation rate was six percentage points higher than it was before or in the decade after. Thus, 70 percent of the increase in employment during WWII is accounted for by the rise in the labor force, with a large part of that increase due to an increase in the participation rate. It is likely that an important part of that rise was due to the effects of the draft and patriotism. The number in the military rose by 11.5 million during WWII. The rise was only 2.2 million during Korea.
Over this same period from 1940 to 1945, the number unemployed fell by 4.5 million. Thus, the remaining 30 percent of the increase in employment was due to flows from unemployment to employment. Since the GDP multiplier is intimately linked to the effect of government spending on employment and productivity, the combination of the unprecedented rise in the labor force participation rate and the exceptionally high rate of productivity growth most likely raised the GDP multiplier during WWII relative to more normal times. Some researchers, such as Hall (2009), Gordon and Krenn (2010) , and Perotti (2011), have argued that the multiplier estimated from samples that include WWII may be lower because of price controls and rationing. While there is no denying that price controls and rationing distorted allocations, their argument only makes sense if the price controls and rationing depressed employment and productivity more than the other factors, such as conscription and patriotism, raised it. The extraordinary increases in labor force participation rates, employment and productivity that I have just documented suggest that this argument is implausible.
The Effects of Government Spending on Unemployment
Given the previous case study, it is interesting to use more formal analysis to determine the effect of government spending on unemployment. To do this, I estimate the following modification of the VARs described in equation 7 in the earlier section. First, I
revert to using total GDP rather than just private GDP, as is common in the literature.
Second, I add the log of per capita unemployment to the VARs. For the impulse response functions, I rescale unemployment so that it has the same scale as the civilian unemployment rate, based on a long-run average unemployment rate of 5.5 percent. As noted above, though, the Fisher-Peters experiment appears to involve a much more sustained increase in government spending. However, even comparing the ratio of the integral of unemployment to the integral of government spending over the five-year period, the Fisher-Peters specification implies a much larger effect on unemployment. In contrast, the Blanchard-Perotti SVAR implies the smallest effect.
The Effects of Government Spending on Employment
The bulk of evidence just presented suggests that a rise in government spending tends to lower the unemployment rate. Given the earlier discussion about how much of government spending is actually compensation of government employees, it is useful to decompose the employment effects into rises in government employment versus rises in private employment.
To study this issue, I estimate the following modification of the VARs presented in the last section. In each of the VARs, I omit the unemployment variable and instead include both the log of per capita government employment and the log of per capita private employment. Government employment includes civilian government workers, armed forces employment, as well as emergency worker employment during the late 1930s and early 1940s. The four identification schemes are the same ones discussed above. In all cases, the employment numbers are converted so that they are a percent of total employment. Figure 15 shows the responses based on the Blanchard-Perotti SVAR. Private employment falls in the first two sample periods for this specification. In the third sample period, it rises, but the standard errors bands are very wide.
2 Figure 16 shows the responses based the Fisher-Peters type SVAR. In contrast to the previous cases, this identification and sample suggest that increases in government spending raise both government employment and private employment. Although government spending rises steeply throughout the first six quarters after the shock, private employment does not begin to rise until after the fourth quarter. It peaks during the third year at about 1.5 percent of total employment. Since this identification scheme seems to pick up more persistent movements in government spending, it might be the case that only sustained increases in government spending raise private sector employment. More research on this issue is required.
To summarize, the EVAR using my defense news variable and the Blanchard-Perotti SVARs suggest that for the most part, increases in government spending raise government employment but not private employment. In contrast, the Fisher-Peters identification scheme suggests that government spending shocks that lead to sustained rises in government spending also raise private employment significantly, even more so than government employment. One should be mindful of the caveat discussed above: since exports of military goods have been an important part of profits of defense companies during some time periods, the Fisher-Peters' variable might be capturing news about exports as well as news about future U.S. government spending. Because an increase 2. The Perotti SVAR gives very similar results. The graphs are shown in the appendix.
in export demand would be expected to increase private sector employment, some of the increase might be due to this factor.
A question of interest is whether the employment effects depend on whether it is government purchases of private goods or government value added that increases. As shown earlier in the paper, both components of government spending typically increase at the same time. Because separate shocks to each cannot be identified with my one news instrument, I explore the effects of separate shocks using only the Blanchard- private goods also raise government value added and vice versa. Thus, the data do not allow us to disentangle the separate effects. In response to both shocks, government employment rises, whereas private employment falls. The exception is the shock to government value added, which leads private employment to fall in the short-run, but then rise in the long-run, even after the government spending variable has returned to normal. In the post-WWII period, the results differ in a few ways. First, a shock to government purchases does not appear to raise government value added. Second, a shock to government value added has a positive effect on private employment, but the effect is never close to being statistically significant. Thus, separating the shocks into the two components does not paint a different picture from that presented above.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the effects of government spending on private spending, unemployment, and employment. For the most part, it appears that a rise in government spending does not stimulate private spending; most estimates suggest that it significantly lowers private spending. These results imply that the government spending multiplier is below unity. Adjusting the implied multiplier for increases in tax rates has only a small effect. The results imply a multiplier on total GDP of around 0.5.
Increases in government spending do reduce unemployment. For all but one specification, though, it appears that all of the employment increase is from an increase in government employment, not private employment. The only exception is in the specification using the Fisher-Peters measure of defense news for the 1958 to 2008 period.
This specification implies that a sustained increase in government spending has a robust positive effect on private employment. On balance, though, the results suggest that direct hiring of workers by the government may be more effective than relying on multiplier effects of government purchases.
A Data Appendix
A.1 Quarterly GDP Data
The quarterly GDP data from 1939 -1946 are the same that were constructed in my earlier work Ramey (2011a) . The data from 1947 to the present are from bea.gov. The only difference from the earlier work is that I deflated total government and defense spending by the GDP deflator, rather than specific deflators, so that the multiplier is easier to interpret. Private spending is defined as nominal GDP less nominal government spending, and the result is deflated by the GDP deflator. All variables are converted to a per capita basis by dividing by total population, including the armed forces overseas.
A.2 Tax Data
The Barro-Redlick average marginal tax rate is from Barro and Redlick (2011) . Annual values are repeated for each quarter in the year. The average tax rate is calculated by dividing current tax receipts from NIPA Table 3 .1, line 2 by nominal GDP.
A.3 Instruments
The defense news variable is discussed in Ramey (2011a) . The excess returns on defense stocks is described in Fisher and Peters (2010) . The data series were kindly provided by Jonas Fisher. The Romer-Romer exgenous tax series is the variable labeled EXOGENRRATIO in the Romer and Romer (2010) online data file.
A.4 Employment and Unemployment Data
The Notes: The government spending shock is identified as the shock to total government spending, ordered first. The shock is normalized so that government spending peaks at one percent of GDP. Private GDP is denoted as a percent of total GDP. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors. Notes: The government spending shock is identified as the shock to excess stock returns of top defense contractors, ordered first. The shock is normalized so that total government spending peaks at one percent of GDP. Private GDP is denoted as a percent of total GDP. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors. Notes: In the EVAR the government spending shock is identified as the shock to the news variable, ordered first. In the SVAR, the government spending shock is identified as the shock to total government spending, ordered first. The line labeled "with tax changes" is the estimated effect of a government spending shock, allowing taxes to change as estimated. The line labeled "no tax change" is the computed counter-factual response in which taxes are not allowed to change. 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 Notes: Data from Gordon and Krenn (2010). Notes: The government spending shock is identified as the shock to total government spending, ordered first. The shock is normalized so that government spending peaks at one percent of GDP. Unemployment is denoted as a percent of the civilian labor force. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors. Notes: The SVAR uses the Blanchard-Perotti methodology. The government purchases shock is identified as the shock to real government purchases, ordered first. The government value added shock is identified as the shock to real government value added, ordered second. The shocks are normalized so that the government spending component peaks at one percent of GDP. Each employment response is rescaled to represent a percentage of total employment. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors. Notes: The SVAR uses the Blanchard-Perotti methodology. The government purchases shock is identified as the shock to real government purchases, ordered first. The government value added shock is identified as the shock to real government value added, ordered second. The shocks are normalized so that the government spending component peaks at one percent of GDP. Each employment response is rescaled to represent a percentage of total employment. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors. Notes: The government spending shock is identified as the shock to defense spending, ordered first. The shock is normalized so that total government spending peaks at one percent of GDP. Private GDP is denoted as a percent of total GDP. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors. Notes: The government spending shock is identified as the shock to defense spending, ordered first. The shock is normalized so that total government spending peaks at one percent of GDP. Unemployment is denoted as a percent of the civilian labor force. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors. Notes: The government spending shock is identified as the shock to defense spending, ordered first. The shock is normalized so that total government spending peaks at one percent of GDP. Each employment response is rescaled to represent a percentage of total employment. The standard error bands are 95 percent bands based on bootstrap standard errors.
